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Abstract
We study in this paper the interactions between migration rates and the level of labour
standards. We use an augmented version of the Grogger and Hanson (2008) model, adding
the level of working conditions into the specification. Our hypothesis is that the differential
of working conditions may be a complementary determinant of migration. In a first time, we
test the influence of labour standards in countries of origin using a database on emigration
rates built by Defoort (2006) for the period 1975-1995. For labour standards, we built an
original index with a temporal dimension. We find that labour standards in the source
countries does not have a significant impact on the probability of moving abroad. In a
second time, we use a bilateral migration database built by Marfouk and Docquier (2004) in
order to test the influence of labour standards in destination countries. If labour standards
in the source countries do not have a significant impact on migration flows, level of labour
conditions in destination countries have multiple effects on bilateral migration flows. Social
protection or protection of collective relations have a positive impact on migration, while
job and employment protection laws have the opposite effect. We also find that high-skilled
workers are much more sensitive to social security benefits while low skilled workers are
more attracted by a protective job and employment legislation.
Nous étudions dans cet article les interactions entre les taux de migration et le niveau des
normes du travail. Nous utilisons pour cela une version augmentée du modèle de Grogger et
Hanson (2008) , en ajoutant le niveau des conditions de travail dans la spécification. Notre
hypothèse est que le différentiel de conditions de travail constituerait un facteur additionnel
de migration. Dans un premier temps, nous testons l’influence des normes du travail dans
les pays d’origine en utilisant une base de données sur les taux dŠémigration construit par
Defoort (2006) pour la période 1975-1995. Pour les normes du travail, nous construisons
un index original intégrant une dimension temporelle. Nous constatons que les normes
du travail dans le pays source n’a pas dŠimpact significatif sur la probabilité de migrer à
l’étranger. Dans un deuxième temps, nous utilisons une base de données sur les migrations
bilatérales construit par Marfouk et Docquier (2004) afin de tester l’influence des normes du
travail dans les pays de destination. Si les normes du travail dans les pays d’origine n’ont
pas dŠimpact significatif sur les flux migratoires, le niveau des normes du travail dans les
pays de destination ont des effets multiples sur les flux migratoires bilatéraux. La protection
sociale ou la protection des négociations collectives ont un impact positif sur la migration,
alors que les lois visant à protéger l’emploi ont l’effet inverse. Nous constatons également
que les travailleurs hautement qualifiés les travailleurs sont beaucoup plus sensibles aux
prestations de sécurité sociale alors que les travailleurs peu qualifiés sont plus attirés par
une législation protectrice en matière d’emploi.
J.E.L: J8, O1, F2
Key-words: Migration, labour standards, brain-drain, labour markets
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1 Introduction
Regulation of migration flows is a very controversial debate, both in developping and developped
countries. It brings fears and hopes within the population and some governments make use of
these fears to impose new restrictive immigration laws. On the other side, these policies do not
stop the emigration of the high skilled workers from developping countries. The phenomenom
of brain drain was seen as a problematic issue (Bhagwati and Dellafar, 1973; Miyagiwa, 1991;
Haque and Kim, 1995). High skilled emigration may slow down the accumulation of human
capital and thus the development process. That is why Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973) propose to
tax the migrants in the destination countries and to transfer these ressources to source countries
in order to compensate the loss due to these human capital migration. More recently, a brain
drain optimistic view emerges considering emigration may be beneficial for the source countries
(Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport, 2001; Docquier, 2007; Mountford, 1997).
Many studies analysed the determinants of migration flows and the social and economic
consequences of migration. Hatton and Williamson (2002) have shown that four determinants
may explain the migration process: (1) the wage diffentials between home and host countries,
(2) the share of young people within the population, (3) the diaspora effects, (4) the poverty
level in the source countries.
Here we will focus on the labour markets determinants of emigration. Interactions between
migration and labour are multiple. The wage diffential is one of the key determinants of migration
flows Hicks (1932). Our hypothesis is that labour conditions may be an additional source of
emigration. On the other side, differences of labour markets characteristics or structure may be
an obstacle to migration due to weak capacities of migrants’ inclusion into these labour markets.
We will try to determinate empirically if labour standards in origin and destination coutries
constitute an attraction or a repulsion for migrants.
In parralel, a controversial debates emerged concerning the development outcomes of labour
standards. The empirical literature on this topic established the ambiguous links between
3
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labour standards and international trade Brown (2000); Granger (2005), foreign direct invest-
ment Kucera (2002), economic coordination Aidt and Tzannatos (2002), productivity Brown,
Deardorff, and Stern (1996); Maskus (1997); OCDE (1996), long-term per capita income Bazil-
lier (2008) and income inequalities Bazillier and Sirven (2008). Most of these outcomes may
influence the determinants of emigration. We will focus in this paper, firstly on core labour
standards and will extend in a second time the scope of the study by analysing the effect of
different labour regulation Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004) such as social
security benefits or job and employment protection laws.
The first contribution of the paper is to propose a temporal analysis on the effect of core
labour standards on emigration. In order to do this, we use an original index measuring the
effective level of core labour standards for a large number of countries. We find no evidences
on the influence of labour standards in the origin country on the probability to migrate. The
second contribution is to show that level of core labour standards in the destination country
may have an influence on bilateral migration flows, depending on the level of qualification. The
third contribution is the analysis of different labour regulation such as social protection or job
and employment protection laws. We show that the effects on migration flows are diverse and
depend on the level of qualification and on the type of labour regulation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model used for the
empirical analysis. Section 3 presents a multilateral analysis on the empirical relation between
emigration rates in developping countries and labour standards for the period 1975-1995. Section
4 presents the influence of labour standards both in source and destination countries on bilateral
migration flows.
4
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2 The Grogger and Hanson (2008) model augmented with
labour standards
Most of the migration models consider the wage differentials are one of the main determinants of
emigration. Borjas (1999) attributed this insight to Hicks (1932). We consider the non-salarial
part of working conditions may be an additional determinant of migration flows. In order to test
this idea, we propose to include different variables of working conditions in a model developed
by Grogger and Hanson (2008).
Consider migration flows between source countries and destination countries. Workers fall
into different groups according to their level of education: primary educated workers, secondary
educated workers and tertiary educated workers1. Let the wage for worker i with skill level j
from source country s in destination country h be:
wjish = exp(µh + δ
2
hD
2
is + δ
3
hD
3
is) (1)
where exp(µh) is the wage for workers with an under-tertiary education, δ2h is the return to
secondary education, δ3h is the return to tertiary education, and D
j
is = 1 if the worker from source
s has schooling level j.
Let LSjish be the level of labour standards for worker i with skill level j from source country
s in destination country h be:
LSjish = exp(νh + ε
3
hD
3
is) (2)
We use the migration cost function proposed by Grogger and Hanson (2008). Cjish is the cost
of migrating from s to h for worker j with skill level j. This cost has two component: a fixed
1However, in the next section, we will consider only two categories of workers: tertiary educated workers and
other workers, because of the database of migration used.
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monetary cost of moving from s to h, fsh, and a component which depend on the skills of the
worker, gjsh (which can be positive or negative). We have:
Cjish = fsh + g
1
shD
1
i + g
2
shD
2
i + g
3
shD
3
i (3)
Migration costs are influenced by the linguistic and geographic distance between source and
destination countries and by the immigration policies in the destination countries.
We define a linear utility function where the utility of migrating from country s to country
h is a linear function of the difference between the sum of wages and labour standards2 and the
migration costs, as well as un unobserved idiosyncratic term jish. This specification can be seen
as a special case of the original specification proposed by grogger2008 where labour standards
provide an additional utility. Here α is the marginal utility of income (α > 0) and β is the
marginal utility of labour standards (β > 0). (4) is the first order approximation of a general
utility function. One of the “destination” is tje source country itself, for which migration costs
are zero.
U jish = αw
j
ih + βLS
j
ih − λCjish + jish (4)
We assume that workers choose whether or not to migrate so as to maximize their utility. We
also assume that jish follows an i.i.d extreme value distribution. Following grogger2008, we can
apply the results of McFadden (1974) to write the log odds of migrationg to destination country
versus staying in the source country for member of skill group j as:
2We assume that we can convert the level of labour standards in a monetary measure. The sum of wages
and labour standards can thus be interpreted as an estimation of the general level of working conditions (with a
salarial and a non-salarial component).
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ln
Ejsh
Ejs
= α(wjh − wjs) + β(LSjh − LSjs)− λfsh − λgjsh (5)
This equation will be used as the basis of our empirical strategy.
3 Labour standards and migration: a temporal and multi-
lateral analysis
In this section, we focus on the period included between 1975 and 1995. We will firstly briefly de-
scribe the migration dataset. Then we will define the labour standards and present our database.
Then we will present the econometric results.
3.1 Migration flows: data and statistics
We use a database built by Defoort (2006) available between 1975 and 2000 every five years.
This database includes data on international migration flows from all source countries to the six
biggest OECD receiving countries (Australia, Canada, United States, France, United Kingdom
and Germany). It represents 77% of the total migration flows3.
According to this dataset, the number of migrants has globally increased from 20 millions in
1975 to 36 millions in 1995. In the same period, the high-skilled migration has increased from
4.3 to 11.5 millions, which represents around 32% of the overall migration. Two main facts may
explain these figures: (1) demographic factors explain the strong increase of the absolute number
of migrants. The percentage of migrants is stable over the period (around 3% of the population)
(U.N, 2001), (2) the gobal increase in the level of education may explain the increase of the share
3A limit of this database is that it cannot capture new trends in international migration such as the growing
number of migrants to new source countries (Spain, Italy...). However, for the period studied here (1975-1995)
this problem is rather limited. Furthermore, our results will be confirmed in the next section by the bilateral
analysis which measures migration flows towards all OECD countries.
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of high-skilled migrants. The proportion of high-skilled residents has increased from 9% in 1975
to 16% in 1995.
Table 9 gives the distribution of migrants among destination countries. If the majority of
migrants goes to the United States (45%) or Canada (12,78%), we also observe large differences
in the profile of the migrants. High-skilled migrants are more likely to move to the United
States, Canada, Australia and the UK rather than to France or Germany. In the US, 40% of
the migrants are skilled, against only 8% in France. Table 10 describes the emigration rates by
source countries. Three groups of countries are highly affected by emigration: (1) the islands
(around 40% of high-skilled workers for the Carribean Islands4 and 48% for the Pacific), (2)
Central American countries with high skilled workers emigration rate around 15%, and (3) Sub-
Sahaharian African countries with high-skilled workers emigration rate included between 6,16%
in 1975 and 10,83% in 1995.
Over the period, the relative part of high-skilled emigration has fallen everywhere except in
Sub-Saharian countires.
3.2 Labour Standards: definition and measurement
Labour standards can be defined by the global principes and rules governing work and profes-
sional considerations (OCDE, 1996). They are multifaceted and may vary from one country to
another depending on the stage of development, political, social and cultural conditions or insti-
tutions. If most of labour standards will depend on the level of developement, the International
Labour Organization (ILO) argues that some of these standards are universal and can be applied
everywhere whatever is the level of development. The Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work adopted in 1998 recognized four core labour standards. There is nowadays a
consensus within international orgabizations to recognize such norms5. These core labour stan-
dards are the following: (1) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
4However, the emigration rate has decreased from 54,21% in 1975 to 38% in 1995.
5See the Social Summit of Copenhagen (1995), the WTO declaration of Singapore (1996), the G8 dclaration
(2008)...
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collective bargaining, (2) Elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour, (3) effective
abolition of child labour, (4) elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occu-
pation. There is an international consensus to consider that these core labour standards should
be globally recognized and protected, which correspond in turn to eight ILO conventions. In a
first time, we decide to focus our analysis on the linkages between these core labour standards
and emigration flows. This choice can be justified by several reasons:
• First, according to their promotors, these core labour standards should not be linked to
the level of development of the countries, in opposition with the cost standards as defined
by Freeman (1996). In terms of labour market policies, most of developing countries focus
on these core labour standards6.
• Labour markets in developing countries are characterized by a large share of informality.
Core labour standards are not limited to formal jobs, contrary to other standards such
as minimum wage or heath and security regulations. As we study in this section the
determinants of emigration in developing countries, it seems logical to focus firstly on
these core labour standards.
In the next section, we will also study the influence of labour standards in destination coun-
tries. For this analysis, we will propose to enlarge the scope of the standards studied, which is
not possible here because of the temporal dimension of the study.
In order to measure the effective level of core labour standards, we use an index created by
Bazillier (2009) which is an extension of the agregated index of core labour standards presented
in Bazillier (2008) and Bazillier and Sirven (2008). Different indexes measuring the level of
core labour standards exist (Granger, 2005; Kucera, 2004; Ghai, 2003) but none of them have
a temporal dimension. We provide here a first attempt to give a quantitative assessment of the
effective level of core labour standards for for a large number of countries with a temporal dimen-
sion. The methodogy used to build the index is the following: in a first time, we built different
6On this matter, we can mention the development of the Decent Work Country Programmes.
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indexes measuring the effective level of child labour, freedom of association and discrimination7.
Each individual index takes a value included between 0 (weak level of enforcement) and 1 (good
level). All these indexes are available between 1970 and 1995 every 5 years. We also add an
index measuring the ratification’s behaviour of the country, reflecting the political will of the
country8.
Once we have our four individual indexes, we propose to build an agregated index thanks to
data analysis. The easiest way to obtain an estimation of the global level of core labour standards
would be to sum the different indexes. This choice is not satisfactory because it will introduce a
bias in the global measure for two reasons:
• Summing each index of each standards to obtain a scalar index would mean that each norm
has the same explanatory power of the general level of workers rights. We have a different
hypotheses considering that the discriminating power of each standards may differ
• We have to take into consideration the difficulty to obtain good data without statistical
bias or measurement errors. If we suppose the existence of a “common tendancy”, here the
global enforcement of core labour standards, we have to isolate the effects of each standard
on this common tendancy and do not take into account other effects. Data analysis is a
good tool to fulfil this goal by isolating the common factors between different variables.
As we have continuous data, Principal Componenent Analysis (PCA) is the right technique
to test the hypothesis of a common tendancy (here the general enforcement of labour standards)
and to measure this global enforcement. Like other models of factor analysis, its aim is to pattern
the variation in a set of variables common or unique. One of the use of PCA is to reduce a mass
7Unfortunately, because of data limitations, it is not possible to build an index measuring the evolution of
forced labour. Busse and Braun (2003) provide detailed data of forced labour but these data are not available
for earlier period.
8We assume to measure the effective enforcement of core labour standards and not the legislation related to
these standards. However, the number of ILO conventions ratified can be seen as a proxy of the political will of
the country. Also the results of the principal components analysis justify a posteriori this choice. The value of
the index is positively correlated with other dimensions of core labour standards even if the weight given to this
index is lower than the others.
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Table 1: Statistics of LS
Year Mean Max Min Standard Deviation
1975 0.5566 0,9464 (France) 0,1083 (Oman) 0,1973
1980 0,5758 0,9830 (Norway) 0,1495 (Afghanistan) 0,2010
1985 0,5955 0,9888 (Norway) 0,1730 (Afghanistan) 1.2015
1990 0,6287 0,9994 (Norway) 0,1974 (Equatorial Guinea) 0,1992
1995 0,6471 1 (Norway) 0,2400 (Afghanistan) 0,1828
of information into an economic description (See Jolliffe (2002) for a detailed presentation of
PCA).
According to the Kaiser criterion and the scree (or Cattell) test9, we can keep the coordinates
on the first factor to evaluate the global enforcement of core labour standards. We then calculate
the value for each country and make a transformation in our data in order to have values included
between 0 (the worst performance in terms of labour standards) and 1 (the best performance).
An increase in the index value will be interpreted as an improvement of the labour standards’
enforcement.
In our sample, our agregate index takes a value included between 1 (Norway in 1995) and
0,1083 (Oman in 1970). Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of LS. We observe a constant
improvement of labour standards among time. However, the “inequality” of labour standards
(approximated by the standard deviation of the index) is constant between 1970 and 1990. We
observe a significant fall of the index only for the last period but it is explained by a lower increase
of the index for countries with good performances. It is easily understandable. Level of core
labour standards cannot be improved indefinitely. At a certain level, a country respects the core
standards (which corresponds to a value of 1 of our index) and cannot improve its performances
in terms of these specific standards.
9See annex B for details.
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3.3 Empirical specification, data and economic strategy
According to the theoretical model, the probability of moving abroad will depend on the dif-
ferences of wages and labour standards between source and destination countries, on a cost of
emigrating which depends on the level of qualification and on a fixed cost of emigrating which
do not depend on the level of qualification.
ln
Ejsh
Ejs
= α(wjh − wjs) + β(LSjh − LSjs)− λfsh − λgjsh (6)
In this section, we only study the determinants of emigration. The database of migration
is not bilateral so wages and labour standards in destination countries may be approximated
by the average level of wages and labour standards in the six biggest OECD receiving countries
(Australia, Canada, United States, France, United Kingdom and Germany). In order to facilitate
the interpretation of the results, we will just include the level in the source countries (as the
level in the “destination country” will be the same for all observations). The level of wages is
approximated by the level of GDP per capita 10. The cost of migration is approximated by
several variables. First, we assume that the cost of migration is an increasing function of age.
The younger is the population, the lower will be the cost of migration (Hatton and Williamson,
2002). Political and institutional aspects may also influence the cost of migration and thus the
probability of migration. First we assume that the more autocratic is the regime, the higher
will be the cost. Most of dictatorships are characterized by a strict control of the boarders and
freedom of movements tends to be limited. We include the variable POLITY as a proxy. The
other aspect is that excluded or discriminated groups will tend to have a higher probability to
migrate (Stark, 1991). We can consider that the more integrated is a group, the more important
will be its cost of moving because of his social inclusion at home. We will use as a proxy
the “competitiveness of participation”, which measure the participation of the non-elites in the
10See Annex D for a detailed description of the variables and the sources.
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public area11. The risk of conflicts may also influence the cost of migration. But the net impact
is unclear. From one side, we can consider that a risk of conflict will increase the probability of
moving abroad as security at home is not guaranteed. On the other side, conflits may increase
the cost of migrating through the increased difficulties to exit the boarders. We will use the
internal and external risk of conflicts as a proxy (ICRG, 2004)12. Concerning the costs which
are specific to a certain level of qualification, we will use the general level of human capital in
the country as a proxy of the specific cost for high-skilled migrants. We consider that the more
high-skilled people you have in a country, the higher are the opportunities and complementaries
for these high-skilled workers. This phenomenom is known as the O-ring effect ?. The higher
will be the opportunities, the higher will also be the cost of moving abroad. At the contrary, if
you have very few educated people, opportunities in terms of jobs and income are rather limited.
In this case, the cost of migration will also be low. Finally, we also add the total population
as an additional control variable. Bhargava and Docquier (2008) show that small countries like
islands tend to have a higher emigration rate.
We do not include variables measuring the linguistic, geographical, historical and political
distances as proxies of the costs of migrations as our data are not bilateral in this section.
Furthermore, most of this variables are time-invariant and will be drop in a fixed-effects panel
estimation.
In order to capture unobserved heterogeneity between countries, we include individual fixed
effects in the estimation. In order to capture the worldwide trend of migration flows, we also
add time dummies. We use fixed-effects models (using the within regression estimator)13. The
11More precisly, it refers to “the extent to which alternative perferences for policy and leadership can be pursued
in the political arena”. Polity and parcomp values are included between 1 (repressed) and 5 (competitive) for
parcomp and 7 for polity.
12Internal conflict expresses the political violence into the country. This variable is composed as the sum to
three components: (1) Civil war/ Coup d’Etat (0-4 points) (2) Terrorism/Political violence(0-4 points) (3) Civil
Disorder (0-4 points). The highest risk is expressed when the coefficient is the lowest (0 point), otherwise the
lowest risk is expressed when the coefficient is the highest (12 points). External conflict expresses the foreign
political violence. Three components are included into this variable: (1) War (0-4points), (2) Cross Border
Conflict (0-4 points) and (3) Foreign pressure (0-4 points). The sum of these components composed the external
conflict index where the highest low corresponds to highest coefficient (12 points).
13We performed an Hausman test on the data that confirms random effect models were not appropriate for this
13
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Table 2: Expected sign of estimated coefficients
Variable Expected sign Expected sign
Overall High-skilled workers
loggdp - -
lso - -
logpop - -
logeduc ? -
young + +
polity + +
parcomp - -
intconf ? ?
extconf ? ?
Note: Definition and sources of variables are available in annex D
estimated model is thus the following:
lnEMIjs,t = α1LSs,t +Xs,tβ + us + vt + s,t (7)
Where EMIjs,t is the probability of emigration for workers with a qualification j in country
s at the time t. Xs,t is the vector including all control variables, us are the country fixed-effects
and vt are the time fixed-effects. s,t, the residuals, are assumed to be i.i.d.
3.4 Results
Table 3 gives the results of the estimation using within estimators. Both for all migrants and for
high-skilled migrants, level of core labour standards does not seem to have a significant impact
on the probility of moving abroad. The coefficient associated to the level of GDP (which gives
an approximation of the income factor in the determinants of migration) is in all specification
negative and strongly significant. This effect is stronger for high-skilled workers. Coefficient
of population is not significant except in (4). When significant, it takes the expected negative
analysis.
14
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sign. General level of human capital in the country has a negative impact on the probability of
moving abroad only for high-skilled workers which is consistent with the theoretical model where
general level of education is assumed to be a cost only for this category of workers. The share of
young people within the population has a positive impact on emigration. Concerning political
variables, coefficients associated with polity are always significant and positive. It reflects the fact
that dictatorships often restrict freedom of movement. At the same time, the competitiveness
of participation has a negative impact on emigration. If alternative preferences for policies can
be pursuied, it will reduce the incentive to migrate for political reasons. Concerning the risk of
conflicts, external conflicts seem to have a negative impact on migration while internal conflicts
have a positive impact. External conflicts may increase the cost of migration due to de facto
restrictions on freedom of movement. Internal conflicts may increase the incentive to move abroad
in order to flee wars.
If the wage differential has a positive impact on the probability of moving abroad, our first
estimations does not confirm the possible influence of the non-salarial part of working conditions.
However, in this first step of estimation, we did not control for a potential problem of endogeneity.
Econometrically, we will face such a problem if the dependant variable would be correlated with
the error term. We may face this problem if emigration would have an impact on working
conditions in source countries. The main question is thus the following: is emigration likely to
be important enough to change the general level of working conditions of workers staying at
home? Theoretically, emigration may reduce the general level of the labour force and change the
composition in terms of qualification due to the sorting of migrants. However, we consider this
problem as rather limited. In average, emigration rate is around 2%. We consider this rate as
too small to influence the general level of wages and working conditions of all workers. Moreover,
when individuals decide to migrate, they are more likely to be outside the labour market in their
country. This will also reduce the possible impact of emigration on wages and labour conditions
at home.
Even if this problem of endogeneity is not crucial in our view, we propose to test the robustness
15
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Table 3: Panel fixed effects estimations of emigration’ determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
logemigall logemigall logemigter logemigter
lso 0.03781 0.1118 -0.02105 -0.40443
(0.55043) (0.49073) (0.75332) (0.67132)
loggdp -0.33231 -0.23594 -0.54504 -0.63261
(0.10664)*** (0.11561)** (0.14594)*** (0.15816)***
logpop 0.38604 -0.14005 -0.32203 -0.73827
(0.25718) (0.30599) (0.35198) (0.41859)*
logeduc -0.0666 -0.02767 -0.52998 -0.28215
(0.08900) (0.10263) (0.12181)*** (0.14039)**
young 3.17633 3.37408 4.04516 4.47231
(1.39050)** (1.47681)** (1.90307)** (2.02027)**
polity 0.01837 0.01034 0.02577 0.01866
(0.00725)** (0.00723) (0.00993)** (0.00989)*
parcomp -0.11704 -0.07123 -0.18546 -0.12388
(0.04134)*** (0.04147)* (0.05658)*** (0.05674)**
intconf -0.02 -0.03134
(0.01031)* (0.01410)**
extconf 0.05625 0.05783
(0.01234)*** (0.01689)***
Constant -5.33517 -1.598 6.40687 10.40669
(2.65548)** -3.24999 (3.63434)* (4.44599)**
Observations 295 200 295 200
Time Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Country Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES
Number of countries 87 76 87 76
R-squared 0.31 0.40 0.20 0.29
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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of our estimation using the two stage least square method (TSLS) and instrumental variables.
The main challenge is to find valid and relevant instruments. Such an instrument must be an
important factor in accounting for the variation of labour standards that we observe, but have
no direct effect on migration. We propose to use the lagged variable of labour standards (L.lso),
the labour force in percentage of total population (labourforce) and the natural logarithm of
the number of different procedures that a start-up business has to comply with to obtain a legal
status (Djankov, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002), i.e. to start operating as a legal
entity (proc99b). Assuming that at least one of these instruments is purely exogeneous, we can
test the validity of such instruments using Sargan test. The condition is verified here. We also
control for the relevance of such instruments in order to avoid bias of weak instruments (Staiger
and Stock, 1997). The F-stat of excluded instruments is very closed to 10. We then consider
that this set of instrument is valid and relevant. The estimation confirms our previous result
(see table 4). The coefficient associated with labour standards is still non-significant.
At this stage, we do not find any evidence on the positive or negative impact of labour
conditions on migration. The main advantage of this analysis is the use of panel data allowing
the control of unobserved heterogeneity. However, the main limit is we only have the total
emigration rate in the source countries and do not have bilateral flows. However, if we can say
that core labour standards in source country do not influence the probability to migrate abroad,
we cannot conclude on the influence of the differential of working conditions, as emphasized in the
theoretical model. We also cannot conclude on the influence of labour conditions in destination
countries. In order to do so, we propose to use another migration database where bilateral flows
are available. This is the goal of the next section.
4 Migration and labour standards: a bilateral analysis
As noticed by Borjas (1999), very few studies have really captured the effect of immigration
stock on labour markets outcomes (Chiswick, 1978; Card, 1990; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz,
1997; Schoeni, 1997; Altonji and Card, 1991). One of the main reason is that the choice of
17
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Table 4: TSLS estimations of emigration’ determinants
(1) (2)
logemigall logemigter
lso -0.90314 1.15376
(0.84531) (1.19931)
loggdp 0.09582 -0.26956
(0.06760) (0.09591)***
logpop 1.40475 0.33253
(0.15959)*** (0.22643)
logeduc 0.06221 -0.20516
(0.06990) (0.09917)**
young -1.04745 -1.96636
(0.99590) (1.41297)
polity 0.02546 0.02452
(0.00623)*** (0.00884)***
parcomp -0.08687 -0.13594
(0.03873)** (0.05495)**
Constant -17.27202 -2.89836
(1.32358)*** -1.87788
Observations 205 205
Time fixed effects YES YES
Country fixed effect YES YES
Instruments L.ls L.ls
proc99b proc99b
labourforce labourforce
F-stat excluded restrictions 9.91*** 9.91***
Sargan Test 0.709 0.4063
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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locations for migrants is endogeneous to the labour markets outcome. Here, we focus on this
side of the relation between labour market and migration. Is labour conditions in countries of
destination have an influence on the migrants’ location choice? We saw in the previous section
that labour standards in coutries of origin do not have a significant impact. We will see here
if this result is robust to a bilateral analysis and will test the influence of labour standards in
countries of destination14.
In order to do so, we propose to use the database built by Marfouk and Docquier (2004) which
provides new estimates of skilled workers’ emigration rates for about 190 countries in 2000. This
database covers 92.7 percent of the OECD immigration stock.
4.1 Migration and core labour standards
Firstly, we estimate the effects of core labour standards on the migrants’ choice of location.
From the previous specification, we are able to integrate two additional groups of variables: (1)
variables on income and working conditions in destination countries, and (2) additional bilateral
variables. However, due to the lack of temporal dimension in the data, we cannot include time
and country fixed effects in the estimation. The estimated equation takes the following form:
lnEMIjs,d = α1LSs + α2LSd + α3Xs + α4Xd + α5Ys,d + s,d (8)
with lnEMIjs,d the probability of migration from country s to country d for a worker with
a level of qualification j15; LSs the level of labour standards in the source country s; LSd the
level of labour standards in the destination country d16 , Xs the control variables specific to the
14As we study the determinants of bilateral migration flows, we consider that the issue of endogeneity is not
relevant here. If global immigration may have an effect on labour market outcomes, as stated by Borjas (1999),
the probability that migration flows from one specific country will have a global impact in the labour market of
the destination country is very low.
15We have a distinction between (1) workers with no education or primary educated workers, (2) secondary
educated workers and (3) tertiary educated workers.
16Here, we use an alternative version of the core labour standards index, presented in Bazillier (2008). This
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source country, Xd the control variables specific to the destination country, and Ys,d the bilateral
control variables. s,d is the error term. We assume it is i.i.d. Standard errors are clustered at
the origin - destination level and are heteroscedastic-consistent.
As in the previous section, the level of wages is approximated by the level of GDP per
capita17. We just add the GDP per capital in the destination country. The cost of migration is
approximated by several variables. As in the previous section, the share of young people, level of
democracy and competitiveness of participation (parcomp) in source countries will approximate
different aspects of migration costs. We also add different bilateral variables (Ys,d) such as the fact
to have a common boarder (contiguity), the fact to have a common language (commonlanguage),
the fact to have a former colonial relationship (colony), and the distance (in log) between the two
countries18. The cost of migration will be lower for countries with common boarder, language,
history and this cost is a growing function of the distance between the two countries. For the
cost specific to a certain level of qualification, we keep the general level of human capital. Total
populations in source and destination countries are also added in the specification, as a variable
measuring the restrictiveness of the migration policy in the destination country (Grieco and
Hamilton, 2004)19.
Table 5 gives the results of the estimation. Because our dependant variable is expressed
as logarithm of odd ratio, the elasticities cannot be interpreted as usual. So, we focus on the
significance and the sign of coefficients. In the first column, we estimate the determinants of
bilateral migration flows for all workers. As in the previous section, level of core labour standards
in source countries is not significant. However, level of core labour standards in destination
countries seem to have a negative impact on migration. This result is contrary to the theoretical
index is only available for the year 2000 but is more accurate than the temporal one. As more data are available
for the last years, this index measures also for example the level of forced labour, which was not possible in the
temporel index.
17See Annex D for a detailed description of the variables and the sources.
18For all these variables, see Mayer and Signago (2006) for details.
19This index is a component of the Comitment Development Index 2003. We assume that time variability of
the index is low which justifies the use of this index in our estimation for the year 2000. It is composed by two
sub-components: the migrant’s inflows, weighted 0.9, an the refugee burden, weighted 0.10. Index is standardized
in order to be included between 0 (strictest policy) and 10 (less strict policy).
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Table 5: OLS estimations of bilateral migration flows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnprobamig lnprobamighigh lnprobamigmedium lnprobamiglow
lss 0.28464 0.53039 0.23771 -0.45042
(0.24869) (0.28684)* (0.28690) (0.33357)
lsd -0.92277 -0.98059 -1.9821 1.149
(0.30382)*** (0.35711)*** (0.36087)*** (0.40160)***
lngdps 0.37718 -0.53486 0.21307 0.38834
(0.06867)*** (0.08264)*** (0.07846)*** (0.09107)***
lngdpd 2.56274 2.55765 2.94004 -0.36414
(0.25136)*** (0.28922)*** (0.28521)*** (0.34428)
lnpops -0.29232 -0.42455 -0.42357 -0.35518
(0.02566)*** (0.03512)*** (0.03319)*** (0.03716)***
lnpopd 1.05577 1.13131 0.83644 1.30858
(0.03535)*** (0.04120)*** (0.04100)*** (0.04557)***
lnyoungs 1.18343 -0.67571 1.10795 0.79896
(0.31553)*** (0.32760)** (0.34077)*** (0.39630)**
contiguity 0.14818 -0.04838 0.58061 0.64326
(0.27455) (0.27545) (0.27522)** (0.33301)*
commonlanguage 1.37288 1.94416 1.1466 1.01556
(0.13136)*** (0.17580)*** (0.17569)*** (0.19110)***
colony 1.41007 0.87112 1.56596 1.41895
(0.21512)*** (0.25867)*** (0.25792)*** (0.28241)***
lndist -0.5592 -0.30343 -0.4878 -0.48616
(0.05806)*** (0.05731)*** (0.06056)*** (0.07353)***
lneduc 0.61653 0.37361 -0.26454 0.73712
(0.07764)*** (0.10480)*** (0.09519)*** (0.10658)***
polity -0.01207 -0.05751 -0.01694 -0.01328
(0.01123) (0.01251)*** (0.01225) (0.01346)
parcomp 0.05522 0.17565 0.23274 0.26717
(0.06046) (0.07603)** (0.07180)*** (0.07568)***
migpol 0.17933 0.19259 0.11805 0.13138
(0.01665)*** (0.01980)*** (0.01930)*** (0.02034)***
Constant -51.72161 -37.64374 -44.87279 -28.01682
(2.85939)*** (3.36238)*** (3.23204)*** (3.77284)***
Observations 1467 1342 1334 1328
R-squared 0.67 0.59 0.55 0.57
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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model. It would mean that working conditions differential between two countries can be seen as
a “social distance”, considered as a cost for the migrants. If this social distance is too high, the
capacity of migrants to integrate the labour market can be reduced and thus this will reduce the
incentive to migrate. However, if we look to the results by level of qualification, this result is only
confirmed for high-skilled and medium-skilled workers. For low-skilled workers, the higher is the
level of labour standards in the destination country, the higher will be the migration. For this
category of workers, core labour standards differential plays as an additional source of migration,
in accordance with the theoretical model. We can also suppose that low-skilled workers are more
sensitive to the level of core labour standards, due to their lower level of productivity. They are
the first victims of fundamental rights of workers’ violations.
Concerning the influence of other variables, all takes the expected sign except the income
variable where the level of GDP per capita in source countries has a positive impact on migration
for low and medium-skilled workers. This can be explained by the fact that poverty is often used
as a proxy of a fixed cost of migration. If people are too poor, they cannot afford to pay this
fixed cost and do not have the capacity to migrate. An increase in their level of income will
then increase their capacity to migrate. Here as we do not have measures of wages per se, we
cannot distinguish the negative effect of wages and the positive effect of a reduction of poverty.
We can also notice that migration policies in destination countries have a significant impact on
the choice of location. The restrictiveness of the policy has a negative impact on the migration
flows.
However these results should be, at this stage, interpreted with caution. One cannot exclude
that our index of core labour standards is a broader proxy of social conditions. More precisely,
it is not clear whether it is relevant or not for some destination countries to focus on these core
standards. As noticed by ILO, these standards protects the fundamental rights of workers. In
most of developed countries, child labour, forced labour or freedom of association is not an issue
anymore and it seems logical to extend the scope of labour standards studied.
Moreover, in the last years, we observe a change in the structure of migration flows at the
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international level. Traditional countries of emigration became countries of immigration. As
these countries have in average a lower level of labour standards, our results may be biased by
this trend.
4.2 Bilateral migration flows and other aspects of working conditions,
labour standards and social protection
In this section, we want to see if the previous results (positive impact of the labour standards
differential on migration for low skilled workers and negative impact for other workers) are
confirmed when we focus on other type of standards. As mentioned before, labour standards can
be defined by the global principles and rules governing work and professional considerations. It
can includes a lot of aspects including level of social protection, of job protection. It is equivalent
to what Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004) called regulation of labour. All
these aspects of labour market are particulary accurate for countries where core labour standards
are globally considered as respected. In this section, we will retain different variables measuring
different aspects of labour regulation. All these indexes were built by Botero, Djankov, Porta,
and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004). Here we will focus on four main variables. The first variable is the
civil rights at work (indexcra) which measures the “degree of protection of vulnerable groups
againts employment discrimination”. The second one is social securities laws (socseca) which
measures social security benefits as the average of: (1) Old age, disability and death benefits;
(2) Sickness and health benefits; and (3) Unemployment benefits. The third one is the collective
relation laws, which measures the protection of collective relations laws (industrial4a) as the
average of: (1) labour union power and (2) Collective disputes. And the last one is the protection
of labour and employement laws (labour7a) which is the average of: (1) Alternative employment
contracts; (2) Cost of increasing hours worked; (3) Cost of firing workers; and (4) Dismissal
procedures. All other variables of the model remain unchanged.
As shown in annex C, correlation between different measurements of labour regulation is
rather limited. Results are given in table 6. The first observation is a strong heterogeneity of the
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Table 6: Bilateral migration flows and labour regulations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnprobamig lnprobamighigh lnprobamigmedium lnprobamiglow
cras 0.02524 0.80235 0.12465 -0.06708
(0.38058) (0.42204)* (0.41441) (0.50230)
crad 1.1871 1.49564 0.28174 1.22457
(0.46830)** (0.49157)*** (0.50862) (0.60358)**
socsecas 0.27145 -0.87047 0.08006 -0.00473
(0.31824) (0.36670)** (0.35636) (0.43178)
socsecad 3.51925 4.07783 2.67544 -0.30452
(0.72288)*** (0.79224)*** (0.82454)*** (0.91335)
industrial4as 0.37262 0.81672 1.18556 -0.55069
(0.37164) (0.39144)** (0.41662)*** (0.47414)
industrial4ad 0.08239 0.79982 1.4164 -4.96121
(0.39364) (0.42711)* (0.45984)*** (0.54521)***
labour7as 0.47106 0.45777 0.62133 0.31434
(0.32482) (0.32835) (0.35441)* (0.42128)
labour7ad -2.01402 -3.36173 -2.85907 2.88199
(0.35888)*** (0.38473)*** (0.42231)*** (0.45622)***
lngdps 0.24738 -0.65091 0.06764 0.30455
(0.09970)** (0.10722)*** (0.11047) (0.12956)**
lngdpd 2.27296 2.50158 2.18681 -0.42487
(0.27722)*** (0.30646)*** (0.31026)*** (0.37215)
lnpops -0.38579 -0.40015 -0.47819 -0.32384
(0.02972)*** (0.03301)*** (0.03402)*** (0.03878)***
lnpopd 1.08044 1.14549 0.89816 1.29404
(0.04218)*** (0.04409)*** (0.04939)*** (0.05476)***
lnyoungs 1.23532 -1.93965 0.65133 0.82559
(0.37440)*** (0.38174)*** (0.40654) (0.48007)*
contiguity 0.42383 -0.03671 0.50523 0.89944
(0.25829) (0.25293) (0.26777)* (0.32327)***
commonlanguage 1.25401 1.55617 1.09796 0.89279
(0.15201)*** (0.16767)*** (0.16755)*** (0.20139)***
colony 1.37533 1.06465 1.64132 1.4046
(0.25131)*** (0.26047)*** (0.26919)*** (0.30553)***
lndist -0.52795 -0.51819 -0.58393 -0.47603
(0.06298)*** (0.06121)*** (0.06553)*** (0.08076)***
lneduc 0.55732 0.32819 -0.36075 0.52054
(0.11607)*** (0.13368)** (0.12933)*** (0.15919)***
polity 0.04621 0.00382 0.04576 0.0315
(0.01704)*** (0.01860) (0.01858)** (0.02359)
parcomp -0.0969 -0.14595 -0.08187 0.10385
(0.09355) (0.10372) (0.10349) (0.12439)
migpol 0.16198 0.1717 0.11586 0.15584
(0.01939)*** (0.02009)*** (0.02251)*** (0.02499)***
Constant -49.80166 -33.87427 -36.45956 -25.13249
(3.62164)*** (4.00166)*** (4.01507)*** (4.80645)***
Observations 1004 973 970 970
R-squared 0.7 0.69 0.62 0.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%24
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results depending on the level of qualification and on the type of labour regulation. According
to the theoretical model, we should observe a growing relation between working conditions dif-
ferential and migration. We observe this effect for the protection against discrimination at work
and for the social security system. Concerning the protection of labour and employment laws,
we observe the contrary. Concerning the protection of collective relation laws, the effect is non
significant.
If we look at the results by level of qualification, we clearly see that different workers have
different sensitivity to different labour regulations. For protection against discrimination, the
pull effect is observed both for high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
However, and contrary to the conventional wisdow, only the high-skilled workers (and in a
lower extent the medium skilled workers) are sensitive to the social security benefits. Increasing
the level of social protection at home will reduce the emigration of high-skilled workers while no
effects will be observed for low-skilled workers. On the contrary, level of social protection in the
destination country is not a determinant of immigration for these low-skilled workers.
Concerning the protection of collective relation laws, we observe a pull effect for high-skilled
and medium-skilled workers while the effect on low-skilled is negative. This latter effect can be
explained by what we call the “social distance”. For low-skilled workers, with low productivity,
access to jobs that will benefit from collective relation laws will be too difficult. These laws may
have a positive effect on the insiders but a negative one on the outsiders. If low-skilled workers
consider their probability to integrate the labour market and become an insider is too low, these
collective protection will be considered as negative for these migrants.
Concerning job protection and employment laws, the effect would be the opposite. These
regulation will tend to attract low skilled workers while medium-skilled and high-skilled will
tend to flee these kind of regulation.
Our theoretical model is thus confirmed but only for certain labour regulation and certain
level of qualification. Increasing social benefits and collective relation laws will tend to attract
high-skilled migrants while increasing job protection law will tend to attract low skilled workers.
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For developing countries, increasing the level of social protection will tend to retain high-skilled
workers. On the contrary for these countries, increasing the level of protection concerning col-
lective relation or job protection will have the opposite effect for high-skilled workers.
4.3 Robustness check
One can argue that this last results can be biased because of problems of autocorrelation be-
tween different measures of labour regulation. As we already stated, correlation between this
different components of labour regulation is limited (see annex C). Moreover, we calculate for
each independant variable its variance inflation factor (VIF). Following Neter, Wasserman, and
Kunter (1990), a value greater than 10 is an indication of potential multi-colinearity problems.
Table 7 gives the VIF of all variables. According to this index, we do not face here a problem of
multicolinearity.
Despite the fact we do not find autocorrelation between different aspects of labour regulation,
we estimate the model with each individual aspect of labour regulation alone to check the con-
sistency of our results. Table 8 presents the results only for our variables of labour regulation20.
From the previous results, we still find an overall positive effects of social security benefits and a
negative effect of job protection laws on migration. We also find the disparity between low-skilled
and high skilled workers concerning the effects of these two types of regulation. Otherwise, we
observe some slight changes concerning the significativity of other variables. However, it is very
difficult to interpret these results because of an obvious ommited variable bias.
5 Conclusion
The links between labour standards and social protection from one side and migration from
the other side has always been a very sensitive issue. Some political forces argue in developped
countries that migrants would be attracted by “too generous” social benefits or labour conditions.
20We do not present here the results of all other control variables that do not change from the last estimation
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Table 7: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)
Variable VIF 1/VIF
lngdps 8.01 0.124861
parcomp 5.91 0.169145
polity 4.63 0.215751
labour7ad 3.78 0.264811
lnyoungs 3.73 0.267856
socsecas 3.24 0.308575
lneduc 3.14 0.318437
industrial4ad 3.12 0.320984
lndist 1.91 0.523790
labour7as 1.88 0.532852
socsecas 1.68 0.593640
lnpopd 1.68 0.594111
crad 1.68 0.595525
migpol 1.61 0.621683
commonlanguage 1.60 0.625834
cras 1.56 0.640487
industrial4as 1.52 0.657389
contig 1.39 0.720070
lngdpd 1.36 0.737802
colony 1.31 0.765065
lnpops 1.28 0.780756
Mean VIF 2.67
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Table 8: One by one estimations of labour regulation’ effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnprobamig lnprobamighigh lnprobamigmedium lnprobamiglow
cras 0.228 0.6741 0.40788 -0.18196
(0.36760) (0.41941) (0.39772) (0.45076)
crad 0.30824 0.36399 -0.50995 1.73622
(0.44143) (0.49498) (0.48539) (0.56031)***
socsecas 0.52439 -0.33516 0.52355 -0.07092
(0.31120)* (0.37905) (0.35316) (0.38286)
socsecad 1.90793 2.04663 1.96731 -2.37837
(0.62836)*** (0.70904)*** (0.69277)*** (0.87802)***
industrial4as 0.81721 1.15592 1.69626 -0.50484
(0.33235)** (0.37210)*** (0.36721)*** (0.42703)
industrial4ao -1.55855 -2.022 -1.0553 -2.41399
(0.30866)*** (0.33304)*** (0.34043)*** (0.38457)***
labour7as 0.69906 0.61987 1.10389 0.05187
(0.27949)** (0.30067)** (0.30372)*** (0.37811)
labour7ad -1.77051 -2.64484 -1.812 -0.33716
(0.26922)*** (0.28368)*** (0.29640)*** (0.33409)
Estimated coefficients of all control variables are not reported here.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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It is clear that the differential of working conditions may be an additional force of migration,
like the wage differential is. It was the hypothesis of this paper. However, the economic links
that we put in evidence here are much more complex.
First of all, labour standards in the source countries is a very weak determinant of emigration.
Whatever is the labour standard studied, we find a non-significant effect of the level in the country
of origin. This result is confirmed by a panel-data analysis and our estimates in TSLS to control
for a potential problem of endogeneity. The only remarkable exception is the social benefits
for high-skilled workers. The most educated workers seem to be much more sensitive to the
level of social protection than other workers, both in their country of origin and their country
of destination. If a developing country wants to play with its labour regulation to retain the
high-skilled workers, it seems that social protection benefits should be a crucial aspect of this
politics. All other regulation would not have the same effect.
The other main result is that we observe a strong heterogeneity about the effect of labour
conditions and labour regulations depending on the type of standard. Globally, we find that civil
rights at work and protection against discrimination, as social protection system in destination
countries will tend to attract migrants. On the other side, jobs and employment protection laws
will have the opposite effect. Concerning social protection, we find that only high-skilled and
medium skilled migrants are attracted by larger social security benefits, while the effect on low
skilled workers is not significant. Concerning collective relation laws in destination countries, the
effect is positive for high-skilled and medium skilled while negative for low skilled migrants. At
the contrary, the effect of jobs and employement protection legislation is negative for high-skileld
and medium skilled while positive for low skilled migrants.
Lastly, our estimates concerning the effect of core labour standards put also in evidence large
differences between high-skilled and low-skilled migrants. If labour standards differential seems
to play an attractive role on low-skilled migrants, the effect is the opposite for other categories
of workers.
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Globally, we find that labour regulations may have an influence on migration flows. Contrary
to the conventional wisdow, migrants are not systematically attracted by larger labour standards
or generous social protection systems. The final effect will also depend on the capacity for the
migrants to integrate labour markets in countries of destination. That’s why we observe large
differences between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.
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Annexes
A Descriptive statistics of multilateral migration flows
Table 9: Distribution of migrants according to receiving countries
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
TOTAL Nb migrants 19 930 853 22 521 662 25 533 157 29 313 872 35 751 993
low skilled 65.25% 61.53% 57.65% 54% 50.62%
medium 14.67% 15.96% 16.39% 17.25% 17.06%
high skilled 20.08% 22.51% 25.97% 28.75% 32.32%
AUSTRALIA % migrants 10.00% 9.79% 10.14% 9.78% 8.57%
low skilled 48.07% 41.40% 37.77% 34.87% 35.01%
medium 20.73% 25.85% 26.87% 29.35% 28.68%
high skilled 31.20% 32.75% 35.36% 35.78% 36.31%
CANADA % migrants 13.87% 12.70% 11.72% 11.88% 11.22%
low skilled 50.19% 46.80% 40.36% 37.09% 29.88%
medium 9.36% 8.54% 10.34% 11.97% 11.72%
high skilled 40.45% 44.66% 49.29% 50.94% 58.40%
USA % migrants 39.16% 42.28% 46.17% 48.54% 49.12%
low skilled 36.55% 34.88% 30.72% 25.66% 36.44%
medium 38.17% 35.51% 34.23% 34.04% 23.71%
high skilled 25.27% 29.62% 35.05% 40.30% 39.85%
France % migrants 15.00% 14.04% 12.81% 11.56% 10.17%
low skilled 92.89% 91.23% 88.41% 85.54% 79.40%
medium 3.10% 3.37% 4.62% 5.90% 8.12%
high skilled 4.00% 5.40% 6.96% 8.56% 12.48%
UK % migrants 10.95% 10.49% 9.91% 9.20% 8.71%
low skilled 78.67% 72.19% 70.22% 68.09% 51.68%
medium 9.98% 14.94% 13.26% 11.35% 19.96%
high skilled 11.35% 12.88% 16.52% 20.56% 28.36%
GERMANY % migrants 10.91% 10.69% 9.26% 9.05% 12.20%
low skilled 85.14% 82.73% 78.40% 72.75% 71.31%
medium 6.64% 7.54% 8.99% 10.87% 10.18%
high skilled 8.22% 9.74% 12.61% 16.38% 18.52%
Source:Defoort (2006)
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Table 10: Emigration rates by source countries
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
AMERICA Global rate 1.43% 1.49% 1.84% 1.99% 2.49%
High skilled rate 2.00% 2.01% 2.48% 2.55% 2.48%
Northern America Global rate 0.76% 0.79% 0.77% 0.66% 0.63%
High skilled rate 0.88% 0.89% 1.05% 0.85% 0.71%
Carabean Global rate 9.66% 10.14% 11.89% 12.37% 12.96%
High skilled rate 54.21% 47.29% 45.45% 42.24% 38.01%
Central America Global rate 4.48% 4.66% 6.44% 7.36% 10.22%
High skilled rate 13.77% 10.82% 12.62% 13.10% 15.21%
Southern America Global rate 0.50% 0.51% 0.67% 0.75% 0.82%
High skilled rate 3.57% 3.46% 3.75% 3.73% 3.38%
EUROPE Global rate 3.99% 4.10% 3.90% 3.68% 2.48%
High skilled rate 8.62% 8.38% 7.85% 7.11% 4.30%
Eastern Europe Global rate 2.37% 2.44% 2.33% 2.38% 2.44%
High skilled rate 7.07% 8.60% 8.50% 8.85% 8.86%
Rest of Europe Global rate 4.31% 4.43% 4.23% 3.92% 3.55%
High skilled rate 8.78% 8.30% 7.74% 6.86% 5.64%
incl. UE-15 Global rate 4.29% 4.41% 4.23% 3.95% 3.46%
High skilled rate 8.63% 8.12% 7.72% 6.90% 5.64%
incl. UE-25 Global rate 0.84% 0.80% 0.77% 0.73% 0.67%
High skilled rate 8.82% 7.38% 6.07% 4.79% 3.99%
AFRICA Global rate 0.87% 0.91% 0.94% 0.94% 1.03%
High skilled rate 7.25% 7.63% 9.51% 8.82% 8.95%
Northern Africa Global rate 2.52% 2.56% 2.35% 2.19% 2.13%
High skilled rate 9.90% 8.19% 9.17% 6.61% 6.53%
Sub-Saharan Africa Global rate 0.34% 0.38% 0.47% 0.52% 0.65%
High skilled rate 6.16% 7.28% 9.71% 10.66% 10.83%
ASIA Global rate 0.35% 0.38% 0.46% 0.51% 0.58%
High skilled rate 3.81% 4.18% 4.85% 4.73% 4.54%
Eastern Asia Global rate 0.17% 0.17% 0.24% 0.29% 0.32%
High skilled rate 2.22% 2.41% 3.13% 3.11% 3.05%
Central and Southern Asia Global rate 0.25% 0.25% 0.30% 0.34% 0.39%
High skilled rate 3.33% 3.94% 3.80% 4.13% 4.04%
South-Eastern Asia Global rate 0.57% 0.65% 0.97% 1.11% 1.27%
High skilled rate 9.15% 9.44% 11.32% 10.11% 9.21%
Western Asia Global rate 3.28% 3.55% 3.19% 2.84% 2.90%
High skilled rate 12.64% 9.48% 9.29% 7.02% 5.86%
OCEANIA Global rate 1.92% 2.10% 2.76% 2.71% 3.28%
High skilled rate 3.66% 3.83% 4.67% 4.55% 5.14%
Australia and New Zealand Global rate 1.78% 2.06% 2.59% 2.51% 3.00%
High skilled rate 3.16% 3.30% 3.79% 3.62% 4.03%
Other countries in Pacific Global rate 2.77% 2.32% 3.72% 3.80% 4.77%
High skilled rate 45.55% 47.65% 50.84% 52.14% 48.71%
Source:Defoort (2006)
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B PCA on labour standards indexes
Table 11 gives the eigenvalues found with PCA made on our four variables (CL, FACB, DIS-
CRI, NR). The choice of the optimal number of factors to retain in order to get a satisfactory
description of the data is not clear-cut. Two commonly used criteria are the Kaiser criterion
and the scree (or Cattell) test. The Kaiser criterion expresses the idea that if a factor explains
more than the origial variable, we extract it. We then consider factors with eigenvalues greater
than one21. The other method, the scree test, is a graphical one. In x-coordinate, we have the
number of eigenvalues and i y-coordinate, the value. We obtain a decreasing fuction. The point
where the break is the most important gives the number of eigenvalues to extract. According to
these two criteria, it is possible to retain only the first factor to have a good description of the
fundamental rights of workers’ global level. It is then possible to determine endogeneously the
weight of each variable in the agregated index of core labour standards (factor 1). Table 1 gives
the results obtained. The first column gives the factor loadings, ie. the correlation coefficient
between each of the variables and the coordinates on the factor. We observe a higher correlation
with child labour and freedom of association. The correlation is lower with discrimination. The
second column gives the communality for each variable. It corresponds to the index’ percentage
of variation which is linked to the factor. Here the hypothesis of a common tendancy (the global
enforcement of core labour standards) is validated by the significant communilaties between each
indexes. Only this information will be measured in our agregated index.
Table 11: Factor Analysis
Variable Factor 1 Communality Uniqueness
Child Labour (CL) 0.80036 0.64058 0.35942
Freedom of Association (FACB) 0.80214 0.64343 0.35657
Discrimination (DISCRI) 0.58064 0.33714 0.66286
ILO ratifications (NR) 0.64251 0.41282 0.58718
21As the sum of the eigenvalues of the p variables is equal to p.
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Table 12: Eigenvalues PCA
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
1 2.03396 1.17982 0.5085 0.5085
2 0.85415 0.22534 0.2135 0.7220
3 0.62880 0.14572 0.1572 0.8992
4 0.48308 . 0.1208 1
C Correlation matrix of different labour standards
Table 13: Cross-correlation table of different labour standards
Variables cra_q socseca_s industrial4a_s labour7a_s ls_s
cra_s 1.000
socseca_s 0.115 1.000
industrial4a_s 0.162 0.277 1.000
labour7a_s 0.104 0.266 0.486 1.000
ls_s 0.075 0.625 0.172 0.202 1.000
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D Source and description of the variables
Variable Description Source
logemigall Overall rate of emigration (in log) Defoort (2006)
logemigter Rate of emigration for tertiary educated workers (in log) Defoort (2006)
loggdp GDP per-capita (in logarithm) in PPP World Development Indicators 2006
lso Level of Core Labour Standards Bazillier (2009)
0: weak labour standards
1: good labour standards
logpop Population (in logarithm) World Development Indicators 2006
logeduc Percentage of “secondary school attained” in the total pop Barro and Lee (1996, 2000)
young Percentage of 15-24 years old in the total pop World Population Prospect 2008 revision
polity Agregate index of democracy Polity IV project
parcomp Competitiveness of participation Polity IV project
intconf Risk of internal conflict ICRG
extconf Risk of external conflict ICRG
0: High risk of conflict
12: low risk
labourforce Total labour force (in percentage of total population World Development Indicators
proc99b Natural logarithm of the number of different Djankov et al. (2002)
procedures that a start-up business
has to comply with to obtain a legal status
i.e. to start operating as a legal entity
contiguity dummy equal to 1 if common border CEPII
common language dummy equal to 1 if same language CEPII
colony dummy equal to 1 if former colonial link CEPII
lndist simple distance (most populated cities, in km) CEPII
migpol Migration index extracted from Center For Global Development
Commitment Development Index 2003 Grieco and Hamilton (2004)
lnprobamig Overall rate of bilateral migration (in log) Marfouk and Docquier (2004)
lnprobamighigh rate of bilateral migration for tertiary educated workers Marfouk and Docquier (2004)
lnprobamigmedium rate of bilateral migration for secondary educated workers Marfouk and Docquier (2004)
lnprobamiglow rate of bilateral migration for primary educated workers or lower Marfouk and Docquier (2004)
lss level of core labour standards (2000) in source country Bazillier (2008)
lsd level of core labour standards (2000) in destination country Bazillier (2008)
cra Measures the degree of protection of vulnerable groups againts Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004)
employment discrimination
socseca Measures social security benefits as the average of: Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004)
(1) Old age, disability and death benefits;
(2) Sickness and health benefits;
and (3) Unemployment benefits
industrial4a Measures the protection of collective relations laws Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004)
as the average of: (1) labour union power
and (2) Collective disputes.
labour7a Measures the protection of labour and employment laws Botero, Djankov, Porta, and Lopez-De-Silanes (2004)
as the average of: (1) Alternative employment contracts;
(2) Cost of increasing hours worked;
(3) Cost of firing workers; and (4) Dismissal procedures.
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